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In the Supren1e Court of the
State of Utah
B. J. ANDERSON,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.

("

EUNICE SHUMWAY,
Defendant and Respondent.

)
\
I

)

CASE
NO. 10794

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is a personal injury action arising out of an
mobile accident.

au~

DISPOSmON IN LOWER COURT
The case was submitted to the jury and the jury foUhd
the issues in favor of the defendant no cause of action by
a vote of 6 to 2.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant seeks a decision awarding the plaintiff
a new trial and remanding the case to the lower Court
for tl1at purpose.

2
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Plaintiff is a supervisory employee at the United States
Steel Company plant in Orem, Utah (R. 163). He lives
in the Edgemont area of Provo, which is an area located
along U.S. Highway 89 North of Provo toward the mouth
of Provo Canyon (R. 163). This area is generally east of
the Orem City limits and constitutes a sort of a panhandle
adjunct north of Pro¥o proper.
Mr. Anderson's normal route of travel from his place
of employment to Provo was to travel east on Fourth South
Street fu Orem to the edge of what is known as the Orem
Bench. This location is called such because the major
part of Orem is located on a plateau that is approximately
50 feet above the elevation of the riverbottoms created by
the Provo River. The "Riverbottoms," as known gener·
ally in Utah County, is an area running generally no1111
and south about five miles long and at t:he point ()If Fom1:h
South in Orem, approximately one mile wide. On the west
side of the Riverbottoms and at the base of the east bank
·of the· Orem Bench, a road which is known as the Carter·
ville Road runs generally no,rth and south. Tllis. road joins
Fourth South Street in Orem by two roads that meet
Fourth South Street in the form of a "Y", one road going
to the Carterville Road in a southerly direction, and one
road going to the Carterville Road in a nor~herly direction;
both roads commencing at Fourth South in Orem and join·
ing Carterville Road within approximately one block of
. their departure from that street. It was Mr. Anderson's
-habit to turn onto the right portion of the "Y" so that he
·took the route to the Carterville Road traveling in a south·
erly direction, and then it was his habit to cross the River·
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bottoms on a State Road and return to U. S. Highway 89
where he traveled north again to his residence.
On the day of the accident, November 12, 1964, Mr.
Anderson left his place of employment at about 4:00 P. M.
tR. 164). He traveled the route described. It was overcast
and raining rather hard. Because of the inclement weather,
Ml'. Anderson drove his automobile rather slowly (R. 166).
As he approached the "Y" formed by Fourth South Street
in Orem and the Carterville access roads, the rain had
turned to a sleet like snow (R. 165). He was driving a 1959
Oldsmobile Sedan, white in color (R. 165). His heater and
defroster were both on (R. 165). The windshield wipers
were working and he could see well (R. 65). He was familiar with the road (R. 164). He had been driving at
approximately 20 miles per hour (R. 166), but as he turned
into the right angle of the "Y" he brought ·his car to a
very slow sp2ed, almost to a stop (R. 166). He could see
Mrs. Shumway's, the respondent's car, coming north on the
acc>ess road just after he had completed the entry onto the
"Y" portion (R. 166). It became apparent to him that
Mrs. Shumway was taking more than her share of the
highway, consequently, he pulled as far to the right as he
could, "up against the bank" (R. 167), and brought his
car "almost to a stop." (R. 166, 167). As the Shumway
vehicle approached he noticed that the windshield of the
car was fogged up so that he could not see the image of
the person driving the car (R. 168). Mrs. Shumway drove
her vehicle north approximately 200 feet, (R. 168), struck
the front end of the Anderson vehicle with the left front
0f her automobile (R. 169). She glanced off of the Anderson car, traveled northerly along the side of the Ander-

-,.
I
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son car, and tw·ned onto Fourth South Street in Orem
'
bringing her car to a halt at the north side of Fourth South
Stroot in Orem at the point indicated on Exhibit 1 West
of the intersection of the "Y" (R. 169).
Sergeant Reed Burgener of the Orem Police Department testified. He testified that he had been a police offi.
cer for Orem City for 14% years (R. 122). He testified
that he arrived at the scene approximately three minutes
after he received the call from his dispatcher (R. 124).
Officer Burgener diagramed the circumstances on Exhibit
"1" (R. 123). He stated that the accident occurred in
Mr. Anderson's lane of traffic (R. 141). He testified that
the road at the location of the accident was 21 feet wide,
(R. 154), and that the point oif impact occurred 13 feet
west of the east side of the road (R. 141, 153, 154).
. He· talked to botll drivers, (R. 28), he exan1ined the
scene of the collision and made measurements (R. 26 and
28). Based upon his e~perience, his observation, and the
statements made to him by the drivers in the presence of
each other, Officer Burgener concluded 'that the collision
took place in the plaintiff's lane of traffic (R. 131, 136,
141). Officer Burgener stated that both drivers confirmed
the point where the impact took place ( R. 137, 138) . It
was the opinion of the police officer that the accident took
place in Mr. Anderson's lane of traffic, (R. 141), and that
Mrs. Shumway was at least two and one-half feet into Mr.
Anderson's lane of traffic (R. 141). Officer Burgener
stated that the Anderson car did not move from the p,);nt
of collision (R. 138). Mrs. Shumway told the officer she
never saw Mr. Anderson prior to tbe collision (R. 138).
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Sergeant Burgener has had specialized training in the
investigation of automobile accidents (R. 143), and has
learned how to locate points of impact (R. 144). He further
found that while the Anderson car had moved approximately three feet to the south after the impact, that it
was up against the bank on the west side of the road (R
158). Sergeant Burgener's diagram indicating the location of the automobiles and the point of collision demonstrates that the west side of the Shwnway automobile was
at least from three to eight feet west of the center line
of the road at the moment of collision (Exhibit 1, R. 158).
Mrs. Shumway's version of the collision is set forth in
response to direct examination as follows: (R. 202)
"Q. As you approached this intersection just tell us
in your own words what happened?
A. Well, it was raining real hard. I was driving quite
slow. It was hard for me to see, and as I go up there I
just started to making the turn as this car hit, and I
stopped.

Q. Did you see the car of Mr. Anderson before the
impact?
A. No, sir, I did not.
Q. Where was your vehicle in relation to this intersection when the accident happened?
A. It was on the side of the road. As I went up the
road I kept my one wheel off on the gravel.'

Her testimony concerning the accident on cross-examina tion is set forth verbatim: (R. 205)
"Q. If I undersand it, you turned your lights on after
you left Mr. King's residence?
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Yes, sir.
You had them on bright, is that right?
A. Yes.
Q. That is so you could dim them when other cars
shined their lights on yoru in a bright fashion?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did you see anybody with their lights on bright?
A. They all had them on.
Q. The fact is you could see without your lights?
A. Yes, but it was awful dim, cloudy and dark.
Q. Did the lights on your car show the way for you,
or were they merely to show to other cars where you were?
A. Well, yoru could say both.
Q. Did yoru have to use your lights in order to discern
the roadway in front of you?
A. No, it wasn't quite that dark.
· Q. That is right. Your lights were merely on for
the purpose of indicating to other traffic where you were,
isn't that true?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You didn't have to dim your lights at all for that
purpose, did you, Mrs. Shumway?
A. Well, other people dimmed them on me.
Q. I see. As I understand your testimony when you
were going north on this ramp road, or as Mr. Garrett says,
the access road, you go with one wheel on the gravel?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Is that your normal way to drive?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. · That is ·so you are certain that you are on the far
extremity of the road?
A.
Q.
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Q.
A.

Yes, sir.
That is how you tell?
Yes, sir.

Q.

Can't you tell by watching the roadway in front

A.

of you?

A.

Yes, sir.

Q. It's your impression as you approached the corner you had started to turn and that is when the collision
took place?
A. Yes, sir.

Is it possible that you-as I understand your testimony you stated, "It was hard for me to see".
A. Yes, sir.
Q.

Q. It was hard for you to see, wasn't ·it?· That is
true, isn't if?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. So you started to turn. Let me ask you this: Is
it possible that you started to twn before you got to the

corner?
A. No, sir.
Q. You are sure of that?
A. Yes, sir.
Q.

You never at any time saw Mr. Anderson's car?

A.

No, sir. I had never seen Mr. Anderson.
You didn't see him until the collision took place?
That is right.

Q.
A.

The first indication and notice to you that he was
on the roadway is when yoo heard the sound of the impact?
A. Yes, sir."
Q.
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Mrs. Shumway remained in her automobile Wltil she
was released by the police officer. She never got out of
the car to investigate the scene of the accident or the loca.
tion of the point of impact.
ARGUMENT

POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO
GRANT THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT ON THE ISSUE OF LIABILITY.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUBMI'TI'ING THE
CASE TO THE JURY ON THE QUESTION OF THE DE·
FENDANT'S NEGLIGENCE.
POINT ill

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING THE
CASE TO THE JURY ON THE QUESTION OF CON·
TRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE.
For the purpose of the argument, all three points will
be considered together, for they relate to the same com·
mon fact situation. At the clme of the defendant's case
in ohief, the plaintiff made a motion for a directed verdict
on the issue of liability.
The facts clearly indicate negligence on the part of
the defendant and there appears to be no basis upon which
the court or jury could conclude that the defendant was
free from negligence. Plaintiff respectfully submits to the
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Court that the only evidence of contributory negligence is
that submitted by the defendant in respect to how she normally drives her automobile with the right wheels in the
gravel, thereby inferring that she might have been on the
right side of the road at the time of the collision. This
testimony, fragile as it is, is the only evidence upon which
the jury could have decided the case against the plaintiff,
and it is contended by plaintiff that such evidence is not
sufficient to warrant submitting the question of contributory negligence to the jury. To do so was error.

We respectfully state that while the law allows great
latitude to the Judge in submitting the questiOtilS of negligence and contributory negligence to the jury, that there
are, nevertheless, principles that are aipplicalble to these
issues that allow the court to take from the jury questions
of negligence where the facts warrant such direction. While
no Utah case could be found which holds that a trial court
must direct a ve1,dict when the facts are such as they are
in this case, nevertheless there is Utah authority that the
standard for directing a verdict as to eontributory negligence is the same as the general standard for negligence.
There are also several cas2·s on contributory negligence
that can be used to support our contention that where no
evidence is adduced by the defendant to show the plaintiff's contributory negligence, the court errs if it permits
the jury to pass on the question of contributory negligence.

Since the question concerning negligence is the same
as the question concerning CGntributory negligence, the
cases orf Jensen v. Dolen, 367 P2d 191, 12 Utah 2d 404 (1962)
and Strlckle v. Union Pacific Ra.ilrood Company, 251 P2d
867, 122 Utah 477 (1952) stand for the proposition that
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the principles for directing a verdict apply in identical
fashion to the question of the plaintiff's contributory negligence:
"Except that defendant has the burden of proof."
Strickle, Page 870
These cases also establish the proposition that the trial
court, when satisfied that reasonable men would not differ
on the question of negligence, may direct a verdict for the
plaintiff. In the principal case, we are of the opinion that
the principles in the Strickle case and in the Jensen case
would require the court to find,, as a matter of law, that
the defendant was negligent and so instruct the jury. We
also believe that the principles enunciated in Cox v. Thompson, 254 P2d 1047, 123 Utah 81 (1953) and Takataro Shiba
vs. Weiss, 282 P2d 341, 3 Utah 2d 256 (1955) also support
the proposition that:

:

"From a fair appraisal of the evidence, reasonable me:1
cannot draw but one inference and that inference point:
unerringly to the negligence of the decedent (defendant), then the court should and can direct a verdict of
negligence."
In the Cox and Shiba case, the court found that the
plaintiffs in both instances were guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. The principles enunciated in
these two cases are also applicable to the situation of negligence and in the situation in the principal case where the
defendant, at no time prior to the collision, saw the plain· ,
tiff and has no explanation for the accident, it seems obvious to us that she was negligent as a matter of law and
that this fact should have been pointed out to the jury and
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they should not have been allowed to speculate on the question of whether the defendant was negligent or not.
As the case came back from the jury, there is no way
of knowing whether the main reason for denial of the plain-

tiff's cause was the failure of the plaintiff to establish negligence on the part of the defendant or the finding of the
jury that the plaintiff was negligent in some particular.
In either event, the plaintiff must state to the court that
he cannot find any basis for them to find 1Jhe defendant
free from negligence or the plaintiff guilty of negligence.
In the case of Lindberg v. Needles, 97 A2d 9011 40
A.L.R. 2d 226, 230 (Ind. 1953), the court held that while
in that case it was appropriate to allow the jury to consider
the question of contributory negligence, in other circumstances a court errs when permitting a jury to consider
contributory neglig€'11ce. The court in that case stated:

"Conversely, if there is no evidence of acts or conduct
from which a re,asona:ble mind could find or infer negligence on the part of the plaintiff, it is error to instruct a jury as to contributory negligenc.-e."
·
"If the plaintiff does not himself adduce evidence of
negligence on his part, and the defendant fails to produce testimony which will justify a finding of such
negligence, the court should not instruct the jury at
all ar,; to contributory negligence, or should instruct
the jury as a matter of law, that the plaintiff was not
guilty of contributory negligence."
"The exceptions of the appellant to the Court's charge
on contributory negligence amounted, in substance, to
a request for a directed verdict for the plaintiff on
the issue of contributoty negligence. The appellant
was entitled t.o this instruction if there was no evidenre

12

from which a reasonable mind could find or infer that
he had directly contributed to his own injury by behaving as an ordinarily prudent man would not behave, under the circumstances."
We think that the rule enundated by the Indiana court
as applied to the facts in this case, would dictate that it
was error for the court to submit the question of contributory negligence to the jury. There is not a scintilla of evidence from which a reasonable mind could find or infer
that the plaintiff had directly contributed to his own injury by behaving as an ordinary prudent man would not
behave under the circumstances.
CONCLUSION

The appellant respectfully submits that the evidence
conclusively shows that the defendant was negligent. The
court should have instructed the jury that the defendant l
was negligent as a matter of law. In the second place, the
only evidence that could be used to draw an inference that I
the appellant was negligent, was the fact that Mrs. Shumway claimed the right wheels of her car were on the gravel to the right of the road and, therefore, if an accident
happened, the jury must conclude that the ruppellant was
on the wrong. side of the road. The inference of contributory negligence on the part of the appellant, therefore, must
be deduced not from proof made by the defendant, but from
her statement that she normally drove with the right wheels
in the gravel. We respectfully state that that evidence does
not carry the burden of proof and that there was not suffi·
cient evidence of contributory negligence to submit to the
jury for conclusion. The appellant urges the Court to find

I
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that there was not sufficient evidence of negligence on the
part of the appellant to submit to the jury; that the court
should have directed a verdict in favor of the appellant, and
that the court by submitting the question of the defendant's negligence to the jury committed error as a matter
of law.

Respectfully submitted,
JACKSON B. HOW ARD, for
HOWARD AND LEWIS
Attorneys for Appellant
120 East 300 North
Provo, Utah

Mailed a copy of the foregoing, postage prepaid, to
Edward M. Garrett, Hanson and Garrett, Attorneys for
Defendant-Respondent, 520 Continental Bank Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah,

this~ _ _ _day

of March, 1967.

Jackson B. Howard

